2025 South Coast Fall Salmon Recap
December 3, 2025
By: Greg Taylor
2025 Coastwide Salmon Harvests by Area, Sector and Gear Type and the Economic Value of the Respective Harvests, and a Reflection on the Value We Place on Discarded Salmon
I hate to finish my 2025 salmon re-caps on a down note, so instead of focusing only on the poor return to most south coast chum systems, I have included two tables on the 2025 commercial and recreational catch, and the value of the catch, of B.C. salmon.
The 2025 outlook for south coast chum was for a poor return, especially for the mid-island hatchery systems: Puntledge, Little Qualicum, and Big Qualicum. There was some hope that the wild and hatchery systems in the southern Georgia Strait – Goldstream, Cowichan, and Nanaimo – would see slightly better, although still poor, returns.
There was also some hope that the improved productivity seen in 2024 would continue into 2025. Productivity has been poor for most south coast chum systems since 2017. The uptick in productivity seen in 2024 had many hoping we had turned a corner.
Fisheries Advisor Greg Taylor
It is unclear why hatchery and some wild chum systems on the south coast have been witnessing poor survival in recent years. But we are not alone. Many Alaskan hatchery chum systems have also seen poorer productivity in recent years. The cause is unclear. It may be predation on outmigrating fry, or it could be something in the larger marine environment, or a combination of both.
But as with many hatchery systems both here and in Alaska, the productivity seen in the early years of enhancement has faded in later years. In some areas, ecosystems have adjusted to the increases in fry abundance. Fry release is like ringing a dinner bell for all manner of predators from humpback whales to hake.
There have also been several recent scientific papers describing the influence of hatchery-produced fish on the productivity of salmon in the North Pacific. There is compelling evidence that increasing the number of hatchery-produced salmon, when marine ecosystems are stressed by climate change, may be reducing productivity and survival for all salmon – wild and hatchery–rearing – in the North Pacific.
The return of wild chum to the Fraser River in 2025 was expected to be poor because the major 2021 flood was thought to have compromised the survival of the eggs laid just before flooding ravaged many of the primary chum spawning areas.
The 2025 south coast chum returns mostly adhered to the more pessimistic to mid-range of pre-season forecasts. The following table describes forecasts by key streams, the target escapement for that stream, and the 2025 return as of mid-November. The numbers reported here will increase a bit as fish have continued to dribble in since.
The 2025 pre-season chum forecasts for key South Coast streams, each stream’s target escapement, and the actual returns counted as of mid-November.
There were only two commercial fisheries and a small ongoing recreational fishery on south coast chums in 2025. One commercial fishery was a terminal fishery on a small surplus returning to the Nanaimo River. The catches were very modest.
The other commercial fishery was a mixed-stock chum fishery in Johnstone Strait. If you look back at the returns, you would be justified in asking what in the world DFO was thinking in allowing a mixed stock chum fishery.
In my day, DFO managers described their jobs as a mix of science and art. That is, they adhered to the science and data, but when the data was not telling a clear story, they would turn to their experience, the experience of their mentors, discussions with fishers, and seek advice from their charter patrol and stock assessment people.
Today, managers are locked into pre-season fishing plans that often quickly diverge from the reality on the ground as the season progresses. This strict adherence by managers to plans and forecasts developed months before salmon began returning is what closed the Fraser sockeye and pink fisheries in 2025 when both species were abundant.
In the case of the Johnstone Strait mixed-stock chum fishery, there is a pre-season trigger of one million fish. Abundance is estimated through a test fishery located in the upper Johnstone Strait. All season, the test fishery foretold a very poor return. This was confirmed by observations on the ground.
But as the date for the fishery approached, the test fishery took an unexpected, brief jump that increased the return estimate to just over the one million trigger for a brief time. The bump in test fishing was already subsiding, as was the run size estimation, before the fishery opened. But managers, locked into a pre-season plan that permitted them no room to maneuver, and unwilling to integrate other observations into their decision making, allowed the fishery to proceed.
DFO has been unwilling to provide the catches for this fishery. My reports are that there was a relatively small fleet and catches were modest, maybe 1,000 to 3,000 chum per seine boat, which, when looking again at the 2025 returns, was still a significant amount of fish considering few escapement targets came close to being achieved.
Due to the lack of fishery-independent monitoring and reporting (you must be so tired of me writing this), there is no information on the number of critically endangered Thompson and Chilcotin River steelhead killed by the sectors engaged in this fishery.
Reports are still being gathered on the two small chum fisheries on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. One was for hatchery returns by a small number of gillnets drawn by lottery; the other was through the Five Nations Agreement. Both were very modest.
The final, very disturbing element of this recap is to describe our collective failure to protect and recover Thompson and Chilcotin steelhead. Think of the expanse of these watersheds. Now consider that less than 9 fish are expected to return to the Chilcotin and less than 19 fish to the Thompson. It is difficult to conceive that they will successfully spawn. We can only pray that nature can find a way. But responsible management should not be dependent on prayer.
Meanwhile, commercial, recreational, and First Nations mixed-stock chum fisheries (sanctioned and unsanctioned) that are known to kill Thompson and Chilcoten steelhead were permitted in 2025. My comment on the mixed-stock, non-selective First Nations fisheries that could potentially kill the last remaining steelhead is that they should be constrained to using well-monitored, selective gear. But I would be hard-pressed (and inconsistent with Canadian law) to say First Nations are somehow wrong to fish for food if DFO allows commercial and recreational fisheries that could impact steelhead to occur.
Who caught what in 2025 and the respective economic values/impacts of the catch.
This takes us to who caught what in 2025 and the value of the catch by commercial and recreational fishers.
I think most readers would be surprised to learn that the economic value of the recreational fishery was many, many times that of the commercial salmon fishery. When we think about the B.C. salmon fishery, images of commercial fishermen come to mind. But this image belongs to history books and romantic recollections of our coastal economy. Instead of picturing a commercial gillnet or troller fishing an isolated part of the B.C. coast or moored in a coastal community; picture a charter boat filled with clients, a large lodge, or packs of sport boats fishing outside Victoria, Nanaimo, Prince Rupert, or Vancouver.
Many would also be surprised that the largest commercial harvesters of B.C. salmon – measured in both catch and value – were US fishermen, not Canadian.
In considering the table below, it is important to note that I am comparing apples and oranges. I have used wholesale value for commercial landings and total expenditures for the recreational fishery. These are the best data I could find for both (see links below). But using wholesale values for the commercial fleet understates its economic impacts because it leaves out the economic activity between the processor and the eventual consumer. One could easily double or triple my estimates for the commercial fleet. But this doesn’t detract from the fact that the economic impact of the recreational fishery was many times greater than the commercial fishery in 2025. As an additional check, I compared the GDP of the two sectors. It only confirmed the wide disparity.
Preparing this report led me to begin thinking of the value of discards. Over one million salmon were discarded in 2025. A reasonable estimate would be that 30 to 50% of the discards died before spawning. My analysis grants these dead discards zero value. One could argue that the retention fisheries could not have happened without allowing the discards. Hence, they might be considered a subsidy granted by the people of Canada to the respective fisheries. But surely, if we are going to kill 300,000 to 500,000 salmon, we should attach some value to them, even if it is only to recognize what we, as society, are choosing, or maybe just grant them some respect?
This table shows B.C. salmon catch by sector and gear type, including retained catch, discards, and totals for each species, as well as the corresponding wholesale value or expenditures.
(As an aside, if Canadians knew the costs and margins imposed by the major grocery chains, there would be a revolt. As someone who is involved in selling First Nations-produced seafood through the major chains, even I, after a lifetime in the seafood business, was shocked and offended. But because the major chains dominate our access to food, we producers have to either pay up or not sell our products.)
In another month, I will be providing you with a summary of 2026 salmon expectations. Until then, happy holidays to you and your families.
Data Links
https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html#infographic/dept/125/financial
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2025 South Coast Fall Salmon Recap
December 3, 2025
By: Greg Taylor
2025 Coastwide Salmon Harvests by Area, Sector and Gear Type and the Economic Value of the Respective Harvests, and a Reflection on the Value We Place on Discarded Salmon
I hate to finish my 2025 salmon re-caps on a down note, so instead of focusing only on the poor return to most south coast chum systems, I have included two tables on the 2025 commercial and recreational catch, and the value of the catch, of B.C. salmon.
The 2025 outlook for south coast chum was for a poor return, especially for the mid-island hatchery systems: Puntledge, Little Qualicum, and Big Qualicum. There was some hope that the wild and hatchery systems in the southern Georgia Strait – Goldstream, Cowichan, and Nanaimo – would see slightly better, although still poor, returns.
There was also some hope that the improved productivity seen in 2024 would continue into 2025. Productivity has been poor for most south coast chum systems since 2017. The uptick in productivity seen in 2024 had many hoping we had turned a corner.
Fisheries Advisor Greg Taylor
It is unclear why hatchery and some wild chum systems on the south coast have been witnessing poor survival in recent years. But we are not alone. Many Alaskan hatchery chum systems have also seen poorer productivity in recent years. The cause is unclear. It may be predation on outmigrating fry, or it could be something in the larger marine environment, or a combination of both.
But as with many hatchery systems both here and in Alaska, the productivity seen in the early years of enhancement has faded in later years. In some areas, ecosystems have adjusted to the increases in fry abundance. Fry release is like ringing a dinner bell for all manner of predators from humpback whales to hake.
There have also been several recent scientific papers describing the influence of hatchery-produced fish on the productivity of salmon in the North Pacific. There is compelling evidence that increasing the number of hatchery-produced salmon, when marine ecosystems are stressed by climate change, may be reducing productivity and survival for all salmon – wild and hatchery–rearing – in the North Pacific.
The return of wild chum to the Fraser River in 2025 was expected to be poor because the major 2021 flood was thought to have compromised the survival of the eggs laid just before flooding ravaged many of the primary chum spawning areas.
The 2025 south coast chum returns mostly adhered to the more pessimistic to mid-range of pre-season forecasts. The following table describes forecasts by key streams, the target escapement for that stream, and the 2025 return as of mid-November. The numbers reported here will increase a bit as fish have continued to dribble in since.
The 2025 pre-season chum forecasts for key South Coast streams, each stream’s target escapement, and the actual returns counted as of mid-November.
There were only two commercial fisheries and a small ongoing recreational fishery on south coast chums in 2025. One commercial fishery was a terminal fishery on a small surplus returning to the Nanaimo River. The catches were very modest.
The other commercial fishery was a mixed-stock chum fishery in Johnstone Strait. If you look back at the returns, you would be justified in asking what in the world DFO was thinking in allowing a mixed stock chum fishery.
In my day, DFO managers described their jobs as a mix of science and art. That is, they adhered to the science and data, but when the data was not telling a clear story, they would turn to their experience, the experience of their mentors, discussions with fishers, and seek advice from their charter patrol and stock assessment people.
Today, managers are locked into pre-season fishing plans that often quickly diverge from the reality on the ground as the season progresses. This strict adherence by managers to plans and forecasts developed months before salmon began returning is what closed the Fraser sockeye and pink fisheries in 2025 when both species were abundant.
In the case of the Johnstone Strait mixed-stock chum fishery, there is a pre-season trigger of one million fish. Abundance is estimated through a test fishery located in the upper Johnstone Strait. All season, the test fishery foretold a very poor return. This was confirmed by observations on the ground.
But as the date for the fishery approached, the test fishery took an unexpected, brief jump that increased the return estimate to just over the one million trigger for a brief time. The bump in test fishing was already subsiding, as was the run size estimation, before the fishery opened. But managers, locked into a pre-season plan that permitted them no room to maneuver, and unwilling to integrate other observations into their decision making, allowed the fishery to proceed.
DFO has been unwilling to provide the catches for this fishery. My reports are that there was a relatively small fleet and catches were modest, maybe 1,000 to 3,000 chum per seine boat, which, when looking again at the 2025 returns, was still a significant amount of fish considering few escapement targets came close to being achieved.
Due to the lack of fishery-independent monitoring and reporting (you must be so tired of me writing this), there is no information on the number of critically endangered Thompson and Chilcotin River steelhead killed by the sectors engaged in this fishery.
Reports are still being gathered on the two small chum fisheries on the West Coast of Vancouver Island. One was for hatchery returns by a small number of gillnets drawn by lottery; the other was through the Five Nations Agreement. Both were very modest.
The final, very disturbing element of this recap is to describe our collective failure to protect and recover Thompson and Chilcotin steelhead. Think of the expanse of these watersheds. Now consider that less than 9 fish are expected to return to the Chilcotin and less than 19 fish to the Thompson. It is difficult to conceive that they will successfully spawn. We can only pray that nature can find a way. But responsible management should not be dependent on prayer.
Meanwhile, commercial, recreational, and First Nations mixed-stock chum fisheries (sanctioned and unsanctioned) that are known to kill Thompson and Chilcoten steelhead were permitted in 2025. My comment on the mixed-stock, non-selective First Nations fisheries that could potentially kill the last remaining steelhead is that they should be constrained to using well-monitored, selective gear. But I would be hard-pressed (and inconsistent with Canadian law) to say First Nations are somehow wrong to fish for food if DFO allows commercial and recreational fisheries that could impact steelhead to occur.
Who caught what in 2025 and the respective economic values/impacts of the catch.
This takes us to who caught what in 2025 and the value of the catch by commercial and recreational fishers.
I think most readers would be surprised to learn that the economic value of the recreational fishery was many, many times that of the commercial salmon fishery. When we think about the B.C. salmon fishery, images of commercial fishermen come to mind. But this image belongs to history books and romantic recollections of our coastal economy. Instead of picturing a commercial gillnet or troller fishing an isolated part of the B.C. coast or moored in a coastal community; picture a charter boat filled with clients, a large lodge, or packs of sport boats fishing outside Victoria, Nanaimo, Prince Rupert, or Vancouver.
Many would also be surprised that the largest commercial harvesters of B.C. salmon – measured in both catch and value – were US fishermen, not Canadian.
In considering the table below, it is important to note that I am comparing apples and oranges. I have used wholesale value for commercial landings and total expenditures for the recreational fishery. These are the best data I could find for both (see links below). But using wholesale values for the commercial fleet understates its economic impacts because it leaves out the economic activity between the processor and the eventual consumer. One could easily double or triple my estimates for the commercial fleet. But this doesn’t detract from the fact that the economic impact of the recreational fishery was many times greater than the commercial fishery in 2025. As an additional check, I compared the GDP of the two sectors. It only confirmed the wide disparity.
Preparing this report led me to begin thinking of the value of discards. Over one million salmon were discarded in 2025. A reasonable estimate would be that 30 to 50% of the discards died before spawning. My analysis grants these dead discards zero value. One could argue that the retention fisheries could not have happened without allowing the discards. Hence, they might be considered a subsidy granted by the people of Canada to the respective fisheries. But surely, if we are going to kill 300,000 to 500,000 salmon, we should attach some value to them, even if it is only to recognize what we, as society, are choosing, or maybe just grant them some respect?
This table shows B.C. salmon catch by sector and gear type, including retained catch, discards, and totals for each species, as well as the corresponding wholesale value or expenditures.
(As an aside, if Canadians knew the costs and margins imposed by the major grocery chains, there would be a revolt. As someone who is involved in selling First Nations-produced seafood through the major chains, even I, after a lifetime in the seafood business, was shocked and offended. But because the major chains dominate our access to food, we producers have to either pay up or not sell our products.)
In another month, I will be providing you with a summary of 2026 salmon expectations. Until then, happy holidays to you and your families.
Data Links
https://www.tbs-sct.canada.ca/ems-sgd/edb-bdd/index-eng.html#infographic/dept/125/financial
